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Abstract
In this thesis, a new practical method to realize one-time pad perfect secrecy for wireless
communication is presented. Most commonly used security methods are based on cryp-
tographic techniques employed at the upper layers of a wireless network. These methods
basically rely on the computational hardness of some mathematical problems. This com-
putational complexity is vulnerable in nature due to fast-growing computational power of
hardware technology, yet not taking into account the revolution of Quantum computing
in further future. Another core problematic issue exists in symmetric security systems;
there is a deadlock between securing the channel and establishing the shared key. We need
the key for securing the channel, on the other hand, for sharing the key we need a secure
channel.
To address such vulnerabilities, Physical Layer Security (PLS) has been widely studied
in recent years. PLS schemes build on the idea of turning unpredictable and random wire-
less channel characteristics into a source for information-theoretic security. Information-
theoretic security itself, relies on Shannon’s pioneer work . Shannon, inspired by one-time
pad, also known as Vernam cipher, theoretically showed that the only unconditional per-
fect secrecy system is a one-time pad with a key at least as random as the plaintext, i.e., a
system that uses a different random key to cipher any new plaintext. In PLS key genera-
tion methods, legitimate parties alternately send probe signals and estimate Channel State
Information (CSI) of common random channel and then convert enough amount of these
estimates to secure shared keys. To achieve perfect secrecy, the key generation methods
must meet the key randomness and Key Generation Rate (KGR) requirements of their
specific cryptographic applications.
In this research a new practical system for achieving unconditional perfect secrecy is
presented. Our system uses channel phase as the probing parameter to fully benefit from
its uniform distribution over [0, 2pi]. It also uses an encryption method based on modulo-
2pi addition of phase values which is the perfect counterpart of XOR addition in binary
one-time pad. Moreover, by intentionally perturbing the wireless channel in vicinity of
the transceiver antenna based on RF-mirrors structure, it produces different random phase
values in each channel probing, much faster than the inherent channel variation would do,
resulting in dramatically higher KGR than any wide-band PLS scheme presented so far
and realizing true perfect secrecy. Most importantly, the focus of this research is a detailed
practical algorithm for implementing the system as well as empirical results which makes
our system the first channel-phase-based PLS scheme implementation, reported so far.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless communication, becoming the dominant infrastructure for most of the information
technology applications, has raised numerous security and privacy concerns as well. The
inherent broadcast nature of wireless communications allows any illegitimate party in the
range to initiate eavesdropping, essentially making security measures an inevitable part of
any wireless system.
Most commonly used security methods are based on cryptographic techniques employed
at the upper layers of wireless network . These methods basically rely on the computational
hardness of some mathematical problems, e.g., discrete logarithm. This computational
complexity is vulnerable in nature due to fast-growing computational power of hardware
technology, yet not taking into account the revolution of Quantum computing in further
future. Another core problematic issue exists in symmetric security systems; there is a
deadlock between securing the channel and establishing the shared key. We need the key
for securing the channel, on the other hand, for sharing the key we need a secure channel.
It is obvious that there is a loop here [17].
To overcome such vulnerabilities, physical layer security (PLS) has been widely studied
in recent years. PLS schemes build on the idea of turning unpredictable and random wire-
less channel characteristics into a source for information-theoretic security. Information-
theoretic security itself, relies on Shannon’s pioneer work [16]. Shannon, inspired by one-
time pad, also known as Vernam cipher [18], theoretically showd that the only unconditional
perfect secrecy system is a one-time pad with a key at least as random as the plaintext,
i.e., a system that uses a different random key to cipher any new plaintext. An illustra-
tion of Shannon’s cipher system is presented in Figure 1.1 [3]. The perfect secrecy means
I(X;Y ) = 0, which was shown by Shannon that is satisfied when H(K) ≥ H(X), where
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H(.) and I(.) denote entropy and mutual information respectively.
In view of Shannon’s perfect secrecy insights, PLS schemes try to establish shared keys
between legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, by leveraging the inherent properties of wireless
channel [15]:
• Temporal variation: the channel varies randomly in time due to multipath fading
• Spatial decorrelation: fading that is experienced by a third party, such as Eve, who
lies one-half wavelength away from legitimate parties is uncorrelated to that of legit-
imate parties
• Channel reciprocity: multipath fading channel from Alice to Bob is ideally identical
to multipath fading channel from Bob to Alice
In PLS key generation methods, legitimate parties alternately send probe signals and
estimate Channel State Information (CSI) of common random channel and then convert
enough amount of these estimates to shared keys. To achieve perfect secrecy, the key
generation methods must meet the key randomness and Key Generation Rate (KGR)
requirements of their specific cryptographic applications, therefore, different methods are
evaluated in terms of these metrics as well as implementation complexity.
The aforementioned metrics basically depend on the CSI parameters being used, and
also the wireless channel variation rate. CSI is basically derived from channel impulse
response h(τ, t) or channel frequency response H(f, t) [24] :
h(τ, t) =
L(t)∑
l=1
αl(t)e
−jϕl(t)δ(τ − τl(t)), (1.1)
H(f, t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)e−j2pifτdτ, (1.2)
where αl(t), ϕl(t), and τl(t) are the gain, phase shift and delay of l
th path, and L(t) is the
total number of resolvable paths.
The most popular channel parameter used for key generation is RSS (Received Signal
Strength), which is the average of received power ‖y(t)‖2 where:
y(t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)x(t− τ)dτ + n(t), (1.3)
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Figure 1.1: Shannon’s model for perfect secrecy [3]
RSS is reported by all transceiver chips, making the implementation of RSS-based
methods rather straightforward, nevertheless, its dynamic range is restricted and it does
not follow a uniform distribution over the range either. This drawback affects the KGR
of RSS-based schemes . Channel phase on the other hand, is uniformly distributed over
[0, 2pi] , yielding high KGR per channel probe. Moreover, phase estimates can be accu-
mulated across multiple nodes enabling group key sharing as proposed by [19]. These
advantages make channel-phase-based schemes the most promising PLS method, however,
their implementation is nontrivial because the channel phase must be extracted from the
received phase in (1.3), which is the result of many instantaneous parameters including
different LO phase at both transmitter and receiver. That is the reason why no practical
phase-based key generation system has been reported yet, although, [13] has reported using
channel phase in a system that allows wireless devices in proximity to securely pair with
one another.
Another major drawback is common in almost all of the PLS schemes; the channel
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temporal variation rate is very slow in static or mobile slow-fading channels. This fact
affects the randomness of generated keys by generating nearly identical keys from successive
probes. Even in fast-fading mobile channels, the channel does not vary in a few hundred
µs periods, which is a rather large period of time in high data rates. Recall that perfect
information-theoretic security needs a new truly random key for every new plaintext.
Before briefing our contributions in this thesis which address the legacy PLS schemes’
drawbacks, let us take a closer look at PLS key sharing procedure as summarized in [24].
1.1 PLS Key Generation Procedure
Figure 1.2 depicts different stages in key generation procedure, which are discussed briefly
here.
Channel Probing: As previously mentioned, channel probing is the process of alternately
measuring one of the common channel parameters introduced above, by legitimate parties.
What is of grave importance here is that the time difference between two parties’ sam-
pling must be smaller than the coherence time of the channel in order for their estimates
to be identical due to channel reciprocity. However, even with reciprocity provided, the
measurements at two ends of the channel are not completely identical because of indepen-
dent noise at each end and also non-simultaneous measurements. Therefore, pre-processing
techniques are often used to increase the correlation of channel estimates . Interpolation
[9] and filtering [8], [1] have been used to reduce the effect of non-simultaneous estimation
and independent noise at nodes respectively.
In our method, we use averaging and a special kind of data filtering to reduce the effect
of noise and discard measurements with very high error.
Quantization: The common channel estimates harvested in the channel probing stage,
must be converted to binary values. This process, as in the case of an analog-to-digital-
converter (ADC), is called quantization. The quantization level,i.e., the number of bits
per channel probe is determined according to the range of the probing parameter and also
by the quality of the common estimates, which is reflected in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
of the channel or the standard deviation of the estimation error. Quantization thresholds
depend on the distribution function of the probing parameter. [24] has introduced an
algorithm which uses cumulative distribution function (CDF) for determining thresholds.
For the case of channel-phase as probing parameter, because of its uniform distribution
over [0, 2pi], quantization thresholds would be equidistance. Gray coding is also used to
minimize Key Disagreement Rate (KDR) caused by estimation error. Inherently there is a
4
Figure 1.2: PLS key generation procedure
trade-off between KGR enhancement and KDR reduction, and quantization methods try
to balance this trade-off by choosing proper quantization level and thresholds.
As will be seen later in this thesis, we use an encryption method which serves as
quantization at the same time. We also choose the standard deviation of estimation error
to determine the quantization level, which essentially yield zero KDR for a majority of
estimations.
Information Reconciliation: This is the process of correcting the residual mismatch
in the final keys, after pre-processing and properly quantizing the channel estimates. It
is technically applying different known forward error correction (FEC) schemes such as
LDPC [10], BCH [4], Reed-Solomon [25], and Turbo code [2] to the problem of correcting
mismatch between the two keys.
In the case of our system, as we use common phase values to mask Phase Shift Key-
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ing (PSK) symbols, it is more straightforward to see that all the FEC schemes can be
incorporated in our system to correct the residual key disagreement.
Privacy Amplification: This stage is used to compensate for the information which
might leak out during the information reconciliation stage, by removing it from the final
key. This is usually done using different kinds of hash functions [5], [25], [21].
In our system, the stages of quantization and information reconciliation are incorpo-
rated in our encryption method which masks PSK symbols in one side and send them to
the other side in a perfectly secure manner, therefore, no privacy amplification would be
necessary.
1.2 Contributions and Outline of Thesis
In this thesis a new practical system for achieving unconditional perfect secrecy is pre-
sented. We basically design a practical algorithm to implement the ideas first introduced
in [7] and also presented here, including four-antennae system model, perturbing the wire-
less channel using RF-mirrors structure, and modulo-2pi encryption method. This thesis
also proposes a two-antennae system, which is the efficient solution for our implementation
method.
Our system uses channel-phase as the probing parameter to fully benefit from its uni-
form distribution over [0, 2pi] . We also use an encryption method for masking Phase
Shift Keying (PSK) symbols by modulo-2pi addition of phase values which is the perfect
counterpart of modulo-2 addition in binary one-time pad. This PSK symbol masking also
serves as our quantization stage. We propose a criteria for choosing m for 2m-PSK masking
which zeros KDR for a majority of measurements, and could be combined with any FEC
coding of binary data before mapping to symbols to serve as an information reconciliation
procedure.
More importantly, by intentionally perturbing the wireless channel in vicinity of the
transceiver antennae based on RF-mirrors structure, presented elaborately in next chapter,
our system produces different random phase values much faster than the inherent channel
variation would do, resulting in dramatically higher KGR than any PLS scheme presented
so far and achieving true perfect secrecy.
Last but not least, a detailed practical algorithm for implementing the system, including
PHY layer desgin, detailed algorithms and state machine diagrams for the proposed, simple
and fast two-antennae system as well as more secure four-antennae system, in addition to
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empirical results is the main focus of this thesis, which makes our system the first channel-
phase-based PLS scheme implementation, reported so far.
It is notable that in [11] a random beamforming method has been proposed to address
the problem of temporal correlation of ultra-wide band (UWB) channel probes. It is, in
essence, different from our method because beamforming needs several active antennae
and a high level of signal processing, while in RF-mirrors structure, as will be seen in
next chapter, only one active antenna exists and random channel states are generated
by simple ON/OFF switching. [8] and [22] have also used channel frequency response in
different OFDM subcarriers as the source for key generation in wide-band scenarios. In
next chapter, it will be trivial to see that this approach can easily be incorporated in the
system presented in this thesis to enhance KGR and randomness even more.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter two introduces the system model
in detail, argues about security of two-antennae, four-antennae, and group phase sharing
systems, and presents the modulo-2pi encryption method. The implementation basics, PHY
layer design, algorithms, state machine diagrams and empirical results as well as methods
to enhance the performance of the system are presented in chapter three. Finally, chapter
four concludes this thesis with future research highlights.
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Chapter 2
System Model
It needs to be clarified that throughout this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis, ⊕ and 	
denote modulo-2pi addition and subtraction respectively.
2.1 RF-mirrors Structure
As mentioned in previous chapter, perturbing the RF environment of RX/TX antenna is
an essential part of our system. Figure 2.1 (a) shows an RF structure, used for this purpose
in this project. This structure was first introduced in [6] for Media-based Modulation. 14
RF mirrors are surrounding a Dipole antenna in the center. Each RF wall surrounding
the center antenna, depending on whether it is in OFF or ON state, acts either as a
set of distinct parasitic elements passing through the energy it has absorbed or a perfect
conductor wall reflecting all that energy. This makes a rich-scattering environment around
the Dipole antenna and enriches the multipath fading of the channel of which one end is
this structure.
From the key sharing system’s point of view, what matters is that with any random
combination of RF-mirrors switched to ON or OFF state, a random channel state is es-
tablished between two terminals, which according to (1.1) and (1.3) results in a random
phase value uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi] in the receiver side. With 14 RF mirrors in
the structure of Figure 2.1(a), we have 214 different combinations which ideally result in
214 different channel states per RF-mirrors antenna, although, in practice not all of these
channel states are distinguishable.
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Figure 2.1 (b) shows a typical received constellation of such an RF structure. Each
blue point corresponds to a random combination of RF mirrors switched to ON or OFF
state. The red zone reflects the received signal when all RF mirrors are OFF. As can
be seen, the RF-mirrors antenna allows us to generate random phase values by randomly
changing the multi-path channel state. The bias of constellation with respect to origin is
due to line of sight (LOS) path which contributes to all channel states. To eliminate LOS,
we can subtract the constellation by its (complex) mean, which results in the normalized
constellation of Figure 2.1 (c).
We end this section by a definition for RF-mirrors structure.
Definition 2.1: RF-mirrors structure or RF-mirrors antenna, whenever used in this thesis,
refers to the structure of Figure 2.1 (a), which generates random CSI by each random
combination of its RF mirrors switched to ON or OFF state.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 2.1: (a) RF-mirrors structure. Copyright A. K. Khandani (b) Typical received
constellation of RF-mirrors structure (c) Normalized constellation of RF-mirrors structure
2.2 Two-antennae System
The simplest way to realize the wireless phase sharing system is to use two RX/TX an-
tennae, at least one of which (and ideally both) is an RF-mirrors antenna. Figure 2.2
illustrates the core idea of this system. At time t1, Alice sends a pilot signal, known to
both parties, to Bob. Bob estimates the channel phase θAB from the pilot signal and at
time t2 sends the same pilot signal back to Alice. Alice estimates the channel phase θBA
from it. Based on reciprocity property of wireless channel, ideally θAB = θBA = θ as long
as τ = t1 − t2 resides within the coherence time of the channel. This process shares the
phase value Φ = θ between legitimate parties. Eve also receives two pilot signals from
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Alice and Bob and estimates θAE and θBE, which convey no information about θ due to
spatial decorrelation property of fading channel. In fact, θ, θAE and θBE are three inde-
pendent random variables uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi], and their mutual information
is zero. In a worst case scenario, where Eve can locate Alice or Bob and get close to
them, unless she can probe from inside the RF-mirrors structure, she still experiences an
uncorrelated fading to that of between Alice and Bob because she is oblivious to their
RF-mirrors combination. This is an advantage of our system over legacy systems using
simple antennae.
After sharing a phase value Φ, the configuration of RF-mirrors antenna at Alice and/or
Bob is changed and the above process is repeated until the desired number of common
phase values are established between the legitimate parties. The details of the practical
algorithm designed for this purpose will be discussed in next chapter
Figure 2.2: Diagram of two-antennae system. Phase values shown are values estimated by
the receiver side
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2.3 Four-antennae System
To add a level of security and randomness to channel-phase-based systems, it is a common
practice that each legitimate party, instead of a known pilot to both parties, sends a secret
pilot only known to itself. It is specifically crucial for legacy systems because it enables
them to keep up with the randomness requirement of perfect secrecy when the channel
variation is not fast enough. In the case of our system though, it is more of a security
enhancement nature. When sending a secret pilot, each legitimate party needs its secret
pilot to be relayed back by the other party in order for them to estimate the common
channel phase value by differentiating the relayed pilot and the initially sent one, however,
this process will cause security problems with eavesdropping.
Figure 2.3: Two-antennae system with phase relaying. Phase values shown are values
estimated by the receiver side. All additions are modulo-2pi
Figure 2.3 shows the phase diagram for such a scenario in a system where each party
has a single RX/TX antenna (two-antennae system). We assume θAB = θBA = θ due to
reciprocity. At time t1, Alice sends secret pilot ϕA to Bob. Bob detects ϕA ⊕ θ and sends
it back to Alice. This time Alice estimates ϕA ⊕ θ ⊕ θ. Subtracting her final estimate by
her secret pilot, Alice computes the common phase value of Φ = 2θ mod 2pi. At time t2,
11
the exact same process takes place with alternate roles for Bob and Alice, resulting in Bob
sharing the same common phase value. Meanwhile, Eve can detect four phase values from
her observations, each two of which are from the same transmitter:
α1 = ϕA ⊕ θAE (2.1)
α2 = ϕA ⊕ θ + θBE (2.2)
α3 = ϕB ⊕ θBE (2.3)
α4 = ϕB ⊕ θ + θAE (2.4)
as can be seen in equations (2.1) to (2.4), the estimates of Eve are not uncorrelated as
was the case in system of Figure 2.2, thus, she is able to extract useful information. For
instance by modulo-2pi subtraction of α1 from α4, and α3 from α2, and modulo-2pi addition
of the results, Eve computes 2θ mod 2pi which is the shared phase between Alice and Bob:
(α4 	 α1)⊕ (α2 	 α3) = (θ ⊕ ϕB 	 ϕA)⊕ (θ ⊕ ϕA 	 ϕB) = 2θ mod 2pi (2.5)
Consequently, Eve can compute ϕA and ϕB as well.
What makes the system in Figure 2.3 vulnerable to eavesdropping is the fact that
during the process of sharing a single common phase value, each antenna is transmitting
pilots more than once. This enables Eve to take advantage of the correlation between her
observations from the same antenna and extract their nonzero mutual information.
To address this problem, Both Alice and Bob need to have two RX/TX antennae
separated more than λ/2. Figure 2.4 shows such a system which is called four-antennae
system in this thesis.
Assuming θ1 and θ2 being the phase of channel between Alice’s 1st and Bob’s 2nd, and
Alice’s 2nd and Bob’s 1st antenna respectively, the process of sharing a phase value in this
system is as follows: At time t1, Alice’s 1st antenna sends secret pilot ϕA to Bob’s 2nd
antenna .Bob detects ϕA⊕ θ1 and sends it internally to its 1st antenna. Bob’s 1st antenna
in turn relays back the detected phase to Alice’s 2nd antenna. Alice 2nd antenna detects
ϕA⊕ θ1⊕ θ2. Finally, Alice subtracts her secret pilot ϕA from her final detected phase and
calculates the common phase value Φ = θ1 ⊕ θ2. At time t2, Alice and Bob exchange their
roles and do the same resulting in Bob’s computing the same common phase value.
What is of security importance in this case is that Eve’s four estimates are from four
12
Figure 2.4: Four-antennae system diagram. Phase values shown are values estimated by
the receiver side. All additions are modulo-2pi
distinct transmitters:
α1 = ϕA ⊕ θAE1 (2.6)
α2 = ϕA ⊕ θ1 + θBE1 (2.7)
α3 = ϕB ⊕ θBE2 (2.8)
α4 = ϕB ⊕ θ1 + θAE2 (2.9)
We know from statistics that if a random variable uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi] is
added with another independent value in [0, 2pi], the modulo-2pi result is also a variable
uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi]. That is exactly what the last terms in (2.6) to (2.9), i.e.,
θAE1, θBE1, θBE2, and θAE2 do about α1, α2, α3, and α4 respectively, making them inde-
pendent random variables uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi], mutual information of which
with each other and also with the shared phase is zero and convey no useful information
to Eve.
Likewise, after sharing a phase value Φ = θ1 ⊕ θ2, the configuration of RF-mirrors
antenna at Alice and/or Bob is changed and the above process is repeated until the desired
number of common phase values are established between the legitimate parties.
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2.4 Alternate Common Phase
It is notable that although the four-antennae system explained above, enhances the se-
curity by sending secret pilots, it has not any direct effect on the randomness of a single
shared phase because none of secret pilots phase ϕA and ϕB are present in shared phase
Φ = θ1⊕ θ2. As highlighted earlier, our system’s randomness primarily relies on intention-
ally changing the channel state based on RF-mirrors structure. Making the secret pilots
appear in the shared phase, however, might be useful in some situations for randomness
amplification or for group phase sharing between more than two nodes as described in [15].
It is straightforward to make the four-antennae system of figure 2.4 have secret pilots in its
shared phase as follows: instead of subtracting the final estimate by secret pilots’ phase,
each node can add its final phase estimate (received by Alice2 and Bob1 in figure 2.4) with
its intermediate phase estimate (received by Alice1 and Bob2 in figure 2.4) and end up
with the shared phase Φ = ϕA ⊕ ϕB ⊕ θ1 ⊕ θ1 ⊕ θ2 which includes both secret pilots.
Figure 2.5: Two-antennae system with secret pilot in the shared phase. Phase values shown
are values estimated by the receiver side. All additions are modulo-2pi
This alternate common phase can also be easily applied to the two-antennae system of
Figure 2.2, where one party, say Alice, sends the secret pilot ϕA and the other one sends
the known pilot to both parties as before, and they can both compute Φ = θ + ϕA as
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common phase. This process is depicted in Figure 2.5
2.5 Group Phase Sharing
One of the advantages of channel phase as probing parameter is its flexibility to be shared
by more than two nodes. An algorithm describing a group phase sharing method for three
nodes A,B, and C has been briefed in [15]. Figure 2.6 shows the incorporation of this
algorithm in our system : at time t1, node A sends a secret pilot ϕA in clockwise direction
to B. Node B estimates the phase value ϕA ⊕ θAB and sends it to node C. Node C in turn
detects the phase ϕA ⊕ θAB ⊕ θBC and sends it back to node A where the final estimation
is ϕA⊕ θAB ⊕ θBC ⊕ θCA. At time t2, again node A sends another secret pilot ϕ′A this time
along counterclockwise direction, and receives the relayed phase at the end of the round
as shown in Figure 2.6. After the two sessions end, each node sums its two estimates from
each session and computes the shared phase value Φ = ϕA ⊕ ϕ′A ⊕ θAB ⊕ θBC ⊕ θCA. Note
that θij = θji due to channel reciprocity.
After sharing a phase value Φ, the configuration of RF-mirrors antenna at A and/or B
and/or C is changed and the above process is repeated until the desired number of common
phase values are established between the legitimate parties. We will see in next chapter
that PHY design of our system is scalable in the sense that it can be used for group phase
sharing without any modification.
It is straightforward to show that this system is secure, but its security depends on the
security of ϕA and ϕ
′
A rather than spatial decorrelation to Eve, as it obviously violates the
key rule of one transmission per antenna during sharing a single key. In fact if ϕA and/or ϕ
′
A
are compromised the whole system is compromised, while in the case of our two-antennae
and four-antennae system, security primarily was ensured by spatial decorrelation and then
enhanced by secret pilots.
15
Figure 2.6: Group phase sharing system diagram. Phase values shown are values estimated
by the receiver side. All additions are modulo-2pi
2.6 Encryption Method
After establishing necessary amount of common phase values between legitimate parties,
we need an encryption method to realize one-time pad. In binary one-time pad, the
encryption is performed by XOR or modulo-2 addition of plaintext and random key. Since
what we have here are common phase values in [0, 2pi] , we use modulo-2pi addition as the
counterpart of XOR addition in binary one-time pad. Suppose we have 2m-PSK symbols
as our plaintext (which could represent the message or a bit stream key to be shared by
legitimate parties). At the receiver we rotate each 2m-PSK constellation point X with one
of the common phase values K which is equivalent to modulo-2pi addition of X and K :
Y = X ⊕K, (2.10)
Any eavesdropper who observes Y , cannot extract any information about X because K is
a random variable with uniform distribution in [0, 2pi], which makes Y a random variable
uniformly distributed in [0, 2pi] and independent from X, and essentially leads to I(X;Y ) =
0. It is easy to see that the Shannon’s entropy condition for perfect secrecy also holds here
16
(as another point of view to explain zero mutual information between X and Y ). The
entropy of X is at most equal to m, while if we consider K as a set of discrete phase values
in [0, 2pi], cardinality of which goes to infinity, the entropy of K also goes to infinity and
H(K) ≥ H(X) holds.
In the receiver side, the legitimate receiver knowing the common phase values, de-
rotates each constellation point accordingly and recovers the message which is equivalent
to modulo-2pi subtraction of K from Y (not considering noise for simplicity):
X = Y 	K, (2.11)
This process allows legitimate parties to have access to m secure bits per common
phase value. If they have let us say n common phase values, they will have n×m shared
bits which could be used as a secure shared key itself. A criteria for choosing m will be
presented in next chapter.
We will see in next chapter that high KGRs necessary to directly encrypt message
(plaintext) by the above explained one-time pad method are totally feasible in our sys-
tem, however, even if we use one-time pad encryption only for sharing a bit stream key
between legitimate parties to be used with legacy encryption schemes, due to our system’s
high KGR, we will be able to update that key before any third party could have enough
observations to break it, which justifies the ‘one-time pad’ notion for our system.
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Chapter 3
Implementation and Empirical
Results
In this chapter the details of PHY design of the wireless one-time PAD are discussed,
the algorithms for two-antennae and four-antennae systems are elaborated and finally the
empirical results are presented. Before going into details of implementation of the phase
sharing system, some basics about implementation setup need to be clarified.
3.1 Implementation platform
The wireless one-time pad, is implemented on WARP1 software radio platform. Figure 3.1
depicts the implementation setup block diagram. Two WARP platforms play the role of
two nodes (Alice and Bob) which are also designated as node 1 and node 2 throughout this
chapter. For two-antennae system, only one radio board of each node is used, while in four-
antennae system two radio boards in each WARP platform are connected to each node’s
first and second antenna. A host is connected to both nodes via Ethernet to control and
command nodes (most importantly sending synchronous reset commands to both nodes
for each round of phase sharing) and retrieve their data for analyzing. Verifying tests
are carried out using coaxial cable connecting two nodes first, to make sure about the
system design soundness, and then over-the-air performance is tested with one RF-mirrors
antenna and the rest of antennae are omnidirectional (one in two-antennae and three in
four-antennae tests) at 2.4 GHz . In all tests the RF clock of nodes is provided from the
same WARP clock board to bypass the Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO). All tests have
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been carried out in University of Waterloo CST lab room. Some of the hardware logic
designs are appended to this thesis in Appendix A.
Figure 3.1: Setup for implementation on WARP platform
Our design is based on WARP OFDM reference design shown in Figure 3.2. The
software code on top executes in FPGA’s PowerPC core and includes drivers and APIs
necessary to communicate with WARP digital and physical hardware. The FPGA part
consists of all of the OFDM PHY and buffering cores which are connected to a processor
local bus (PLB) which is the interface of FPGA cores and PowerPC core. At the bot-
tom, there are actual hardware peripherals including WARP radio boards and Ethernet
transceivers. A detailed description of WARP hardware and OFDM reference design can
be found here. As we will see throughout this chapter, we just use the backbone of the
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OFDM reference design, that is, the basic drivers and API in software to communicate
with hardware and some basic cores in FPGA, and the rest of the design is completely
changed.
Figure 3.2: OFDM reference design block diagram. Copyright WARP project
3.2 RF-mirrors Switching
As briefed in section 2.1, we need to switch the configuration of RF-mirrors ON/OFF
state in order to generate random channel states for each round of phase sharing. Each
RF mirror as depicted in Figure 3.3 (a) is a set of 6 conductor patches connected to each
other with high frequency PIN diodes. If these PIN diodes are ON, the conductor patches
are connected and act as a perfect conductor wall reflecting the incident wave, whereas if
they are OFF, the disjoint conductor patches act as a set of parasitic elements radiating
the incident wave.
To randomly turn 14 RF mirrors ON and OFF, we generate a set of N 14-bits random
numbers in the range of [0, 214 − 1] in the software of each WARP node, and put them in
a RAM block of FPGA core. The output of this RAM is made external to FPGA core
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and is connected to the physical pins of FPGA which are connected to a general purpose
I/O connector. This connector in turn is connected to the RF-mirrors structure with a
high speed cable as shown in Figure 3.3 (b). With each new round of phase sharing, the
address line of the RAM block points to a new 14-bit random value changing the state
of RF-mirrors. After sharing N phase values, a new set of N random numbers can be
generated by software. The logic designed for RF-mirrors switching is shown in Figure
A.6.
To turn on all seven PIN diodes of an RF mirror wall, we need a voltage much higher
than the logic voltage, therefore, we use a level shifter which can turn the logic voltage
at its input to high-voltage at its output. MAX17079 is a 7-channel logic to high-voltage
level shifter with input pulse frequency up to 2 MHz. Since we have 14 bits, we are using
two MAX17079 chips, whose 14 high-voltage outputs are connected to our 14 RF mirrors
translating the random 14-bit combination number to random ON/OFF combination of
RF mirrors. Figure 3.3 (c) shows the bottom view of RF-mirrors PCB with two level
shifters.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 3.3: Explaining RF-mirrors switching (a) A single RF mirror board (b) WARP IO
connection to RF-mirrors structure (c) level shifter chips on bottom side of RF-mirrors
structure
3.3 OFDM System Model
In wideband wireless communications, OFDM is the best known modulation to overcome
severe effects of frequency-selective fading while keeping the high data rate. Since we
choose OFDM as the basic modulation for our implementation, it is necessary to take a
look at it. Figure 3.4 shows an OFDM system with Ns subcarriers. At time step n , the
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received signal at kth subcarrier can be expressed as
Y (n, k) = X(n, k)H(n, k) +W (n, k), k = 0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1 (3.1)
where {X(n, k), k = 0, 1, . . . , Ns−1} is the transmit data block and W (n, k) is the complex
zero-mean AWGN which is uncorrelated for different n and k. H(n, k) is the frequency
response of the multipath fading channel and is expressed as
H(n, k) =
L∑
l=1
h(n, l) exp(−j2pikτl
Ns
) (3.2)
where h(n, l) is the impulse response of lth path with delay of τl, and L is the total number
of resolvable paths in the channel. In fact, (3.2) is the digital version of (1.2).
What we are trying to do in this project is some form of channel estimation, in the sense
that by sending pilots for X(n, k) and observing Y (n, k), we want to estimate H(n, k) and
then extract its phase as channel probing parameter. What happens to index k is that as
we will see, we are using just one OFDM tone, therefore, for simplicity we will drop index
k, and n will be the only index representing successive channel probes.
Figure 3.4: Baseband digital OFDM system model
3.4 PHY Design
Physical layer design is based on WARP OFDM reference design, although the only part
remained from the main core of that design, is the preamble structure for timing synchro-
nization and AGC. This is the IEEE 802.11a preamble which consists of two 160-sample
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parts. The first part is a repetition of 10 16-sample sequences, called short training symbols
(STS). The second part is 2.5 repetitions of a 64-sample sequence, called the long training
symbol (LTS). A detailed description of WARP OFDM physical layer can be found here.
Figure 3.5 (a) shows the frame format of the PHY layer baseband signal designed for this
project. This frame is being sent in every single burst transmission both in two-antennae
and four-antennae case. After the 320-samples preamble, there are phase reference and
payload parts, each consisting of two OFDM symbols. Each OFDM symbol has 64 sub-
carriers with a 16 samples cyclic prefix to manage the delay spread of multi-path fading
channel. Only a single tone on the 49th subcarrier of the OFDM symbol, with the RF
frequency of fc + 2.5 MHz (with a 10 MHz overall over-the-air bandwidth), is sent and
all other subcarriers are silent. This reduces the IFFT in the transmission side to time
samples of a single tone with a cyclic prefix, and the FFT in the receiver side to a weighted
averaging of that single tone.
As emphasized earlier, channel phase estimation is a nontrivial practice in PLS schemes.
The reason is that the absolute received phase depends on many instantaneous factors in-
cluding LO phase, and thus is a meaningless random parameter. To make it meaningful
we need to establish some kind of reference to calculate all phase values comparing to that
reference. One common way to do so is sending a phase reference pilot as shown in Figure
3.5 (b). The phase reference goes through any end-to-end circuitry as the payload, there-
fore, their phase difference could convey the information of payload. The phase reference
section always carries the reference symbol, e.g., 1 + 0j over reference channel state which
is the state in which all RF-mirrors are OFF. The dashed line in Figure 3.5 (b) denotes
the channel state transition from reference state to the random state n due to switching
the RF-mirrors combination.
Definition 3.1: reference channel state is the state in which all RF-mirrors are OFF.
Let us denote the received symbol of payload for nth channel state by Y p(n), and the
received symbol of reference preceding that by Y r(n). For any received frame or burst, the
detected or estimated channel phase, is defined as modulo-2pi subtraction of the phase of
payload (detected) symbol θp(n) by the phase of reference symbol θr(n), or equivalently,
the phase of the quotient of the complex division of payload symbol by the phase reference
symbol. We summarize this discussion in the following definitions.
Definition 3.2: detected or estimated symbol Hˆ(n) for any channel state n, which
is actually an estimation of channel frequency response in a single tone of OFDM, is the
quotient of the complex division of payload symbol Y p(n) by the phase reference symbol
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Y r(n) :
Hˆ(n) =
Y p(n)
Y r(n)
(3.3)
Definition 3.3: detected or estimated channel phase Φ(n) is defined as modulo-2pi
subtraction of the phase of payload (detected) symbol θp(n) by the phase of reference
symbol θr(n) :
Φ(n) = ∠Hˆ(n) = θp(n)	 θr(n) (3.4)
A key advantage of the PHY design described in this section, is its scalability. Not only
it is applied to both two-antennae and four-antennae system, but also it is applicable to
any channel-phase-based system including group key generation scheme of section 2.5.
The IFFT and FFT are implemented in hardware by precomputing the IFFT of the
single tone and FFT coefficients for demodulating that single tone, putting them in RAM
blocks and reading them in real time. It is notable that in both phase reference and payload
sections, the FFT is only executed on the second OFDM symbol. The first symbol as shown
with the dashed line in Figure 3.5 (a), both in transmitter and receiver, triggers the RF-
mirrors switching and makes time for it to settle down. Figure A.1 and A.2 show the core
designed for IFFT and FFT respectively.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.5: (a) PHY frame format of wireless one-time pad (b) Phase referencing and
estimation in wireless one-time pad
For four-antennae system the phase relaying is implemented with complex multipli-
cation. Suppose that the estimated phase is ϕ, the relaying in case of a single tone is
equivalent to multiplying the IFFT of that single tone, by ejϕ (detected symbol). The
logic core designed for this purpose is illustrated in Figure A.7.
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3.5 Phase Sharing Algorithm
As discussed in section 2.2, the simplest way to realize the wireless phase sharing system
is two-antennae system with at least one RF-mirrors antenna. Consider the system in
Figure 2.2. Suppose we have N distinguishable random channel states between Alice and
Bob with the reference state corresponding to all RF mirrors OFF state. The detailed
algorithm of two-antennae system can be described as follows:
for n = 1 to N
1. Alice transmits a frame like in Figure 3.5 (a) with reference symbol 1 + 0j in both
reference and payload sections, in which only for the payload section, she changes
the state of her RF-mirrors to nth random state
2. Bob upon detecting this frame, sets his RF-mirrors to reference state for phase ref-
erence part and goes to nth state for the payload, and estimates channel phase θAB
and store it
3. Immediately after receiving the whole frame, Bob sends exactly the same frame back
to Alice
4. Alice on receiving side, does exactly as Bob did in step 2 and estimates channel phase
θBA and store it
5. Back to step 1
The detailed algorithm of four-antennae system according to Figure 2.4 can be described
as follows:
for n = 1 to N
1. Alice 1 transmits a frame like in Figure 3.5 (a) to Bob 2 with reference symbol 1+0j
and ejϕA in reference and payload sections respectively, in which only for the payload
section, she changes the state of her RF-mirrors to nth random state
2. Bob upon detecting this frame, sets Bob 2 RF-mirrors to reference state for phase
reference part and goes to nth state for the payload, and estimates channel phase
plus Alice’s secret phase ϕA ⊕ θA1B2 and internally sends it to Bob 1
3. Bob 1 transmits a frame according to Fig. 3.5 (a) to Alice 2 with reference symbol
1 + 0j and ej(ϕA+θA1B2 ) in reference and payload sections respectively, in which only
for the payload section, he changes the state of his RF-mirrors to nth random state
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4. Alice on receiving side, does exactly as Bob did in step 2 and estimates channel phase
plus her own secret phase θA1B2 ⊕ θB1A2 ⊕ ϕA, modulo-2pi subtracts her secret phase
from estimated phase and stores the result θA1B2 ⊕ θB1A2
5. Step 5 to 8 are replicas of step 1 to 4 with ϕB, Bob 2, Alice 1, Alice 2, and Bob 1
taking the role of ϕA, Alice 1, Bob 2, Bob 1, and Alice 2 respectively, resulting in
Bob storing θA2B1 ⊕ θB2A1
6. Back to step 1
The logic for both two-antennae and four-antennae systems is designed in a sequential
way in the sense that any step of a single round in above algorithms takes place if the
previous step has finished correctly. As a result, the slave node only estimates a phase if the
master node has estimated the phase for that round. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show the detailed
state machine diagram for two-antennae and four-antennae system. The synchronous reset
is sent by host to both nodes for each round of phase sharing. In all yellow sections, if
a frame is not detected, the logic stays at that stage until it detects a frame or a reset
is asserted. Each frame transmission and reception in each node, includes RF-mirrors
transition from reference channel state to the random channel state of that round, starting
the payload section as shown in Figure 3.5 (a) and described in above detailed algorithms.
The logic core designed for master and slave nodes are the same. Only by setting a
signal in software, the core performs accordingly as the master or slave node. It means
that both nodes of the two-antennae system use the logic core depicted in Figure A.4 and
A.5 in TX and RX mode respectively. The counterparts for the four-antennae system are
Figure A.8 and A.9.
3.6 Empirical Results
In this section we present the empirical results obtained from extensive tests on the actual
system implemented according to designs introduced in previous section. A major part of
results present the phase values shared by two nodes, the difference or error in two nodes’
values, and measures to reduce this error, followed by a discussion on the KGR which is
obtainable by our implementation.
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3.6.1 Pre-processing
In both algorithms, the stored values by Alice and Bob in each round are ideally the same
based on arguments made in previous chapter, and could be used to encrypt and decrypt
PSK symbols according to section 2.6. But, in practice there is an error between shared
values in two nodes, basically due to independent noise at two sides and other imperfec-
tions in the system. Therefore, the stored values need some pre-processing to increase the
correlation of estimates of two nodes, or equivalently, reduce the estimation error. These
issues are discussed in this part. Before moving forward we set some definitions for clari-
fying the upcoming discussions.
Definition 3.4: Suppose we have N estimated symbols {Hˆ(n), n = 1, 2, . . . , N} ac-
cording to Definition 3.2 with complex mean value µ and scalar standard deviation σ, which
comprise our original constellation. Normalized constellation is defined by subtracting this
original constellation by its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation as
Hˆnorm(n) =
(Hˆ(n)− µ)
σ
n = 1, 2, . . . , N (3.5)
Definition 3.5: Normalized energy is defined as the energy of points in the normalized
constellation defined in Definition 3.4.
Definition 3.6: LOS-dominant points are points in the vicinity of LOS point in the
original constellation, which ideally is 1 + 0j. They naturally comprise low-normalized-
energy points or points in the vicinity of origin in the normalized constellation defined in
Definition 3.4.
LOS-dominant data disposal: As briefly discussed in section 2.1, there is an LOS
component which contributes to all channel states including the reference state, and makes
the constellation points Hˆ(n) spreading around LOS point 1 + 0j. LOS is a constant
predictable component which is not suitable for exchanging information. It also adds a
bias to each component preventing the random phase values to be uniformly distributed
over [0, 2pi]. To overcome this shortcoming, the first thing each node shall do is that after
storing a predefined number of constellation points (sayN), that constellation is normalized
according to Definition 3.4.
Fig. 3.8 (a) shows the result of sharing 1000 phase values between two nodes for
the two-antennae system. As can be seen, as a result of constellation normalizing, the
shared phase values randomly span the range of [0, 2pi]. The error is a zero-mean random
variable with standard deviation σE (denoted by STD in figures) of 17.85
◦ . There are some
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error values noticeably higher than σE, highlighted with red color. Interestingly enough,
we found out they correspond to the red zone of original and normalized constellation
depicted in Figure 3.8 (b) and (c) respectively. To explain this correspondence, we should
note that points close to LOS point in the original constellation which are called LOS-
dominant points according to Definition 3.6, convey little or no information, and when
subtracted by LOS component become noise-dominant points in normalized constellation.
To verify this, we selected points with normalized energy less than 0.25 in the normalized
constellation (inside a circle with radius 0.5 in Figure 3.8 (c)) . Expectedly, this region
was equivalent to a circle around the LOS point in original constellation of Figure 3.8 (b),
and not surprisingly covered all high error values in Figure 3.8 (a).
In view of above discussion, as a practical measure we can set a preselected normalized
SNR and discard all the received points with a normalized energy less than this preselected
threshold ( here 0.25) in both nodes, which essentially means removing phase values that
have high error in estimated value between nodes. Figure 3.9 illustrates the effect of such a
data filtering in another test for two-antennae system, where again points with normalized
energy less than 0.25 have been discarded. As can be seen σE of error (calculated over
5000 points) is reduced from 16.17◦ to 12.5◦ and phase estimates with high error has been
eliminated at the expense of removing about 20%t of data. This rate could obviously
diminish by choosing RF-mirrors configurations that lead to more non- LOS-dominant, or
equivalently multipath-dominant points.
For the four-antennae system we exactly do the same about the constellation normal-
izing and LOS-dominant point removal. Here σE of error is higher than two-antennae
system because the overall noise is higher due to double estimation and phase relaying
error. Therefore, we choose points with normalized energy less than 0.36 (inside a circle
with radius 0.6 in normalized constellation) to discard, which consist around 30% of data.
The results are depicted in Figure 3.10 where data filtering helps reducing the σE of error
(calculated over 5000 points) from 20.8◦ to 12.92◦.
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Averaging: Another way of reducing the estimation error is averaging in time. That
is, the payload section in Figure 3.5 (a) is extended to send n+ 1 OFDM symbols instead
of two. In the receiver side n OFDM symbols (one is reserved for switching time) are
detected, all of which are divided by the same reference symbol and finally averaged over.
This, as expected, would reduce the estimation error. Figure 3.11 (a) shows the effect of
averaging on σE of estimation error for different number of OFDM symbols. It can be seen
that the σE error is reduced to around 9
◦ and 6◦ for the case of no data disposal and less
than 0.25 normalized-energy data disposal by averaging over 20 OFDM symbols, however,
after that the estimation error begins to increase again. The reason is that the frame time
duration is getting larger by averaging, and at some point it exceeds the coherence time of
channel.
Figure 3.11 (b) also illustrates the effect of choosing different thresholds for low-
normalized-energy data disposal on σE of estimation error. Obviously, by keeping higher
normalized-energy points, that is, points that are farther from the LOS point in the origi-
nal constellation, σE of error is reduced, which means we have less estimations with high
error value. We can see that by combining the averaging and keeping high energy points,
we can reach to errors with σE as low as 5
◦ for two-antennae system.
There is a trade-off between reducing error and keeping up the KGR of the system,
since both data disposal and averaging diminish the effective KGR of the system. In the
case of the former, choosing RF-mirrors combinations which produce channel states as far
as possible to LOS point could reduce the data disposal rate. For the latter, we can move
averaging from time domain to frequency domain or use a combination of both. Especially
for four-antennae system, averaging in time domain is not practical because the process of
sharing a single key takes at least twice as much time compared to two-antennae system
even without averaging.
Moving the averaging to frequency domain can be explained as follows: consider the
OFDM system of section 3.3 with Ns subcarriers and L resolvable paths in the wide-
band channel (L is proportional to our bandwidth and delay spread of channel) . Then,
every bNs
L
c adjacent tones of OFDM are highly correlated because they reside within the
coherence bandwidth of the channel, which essentially means that they experience quite
the same fading and are suitable for averaging over. Note that in spite of adjacent channel
estimations H(n, k), noise components W (n, k) are independent with respect to both k and
n. That is why averaging in frequency domain could diminish the effect of noise as well
as time averaging. On the other hand, we have L uncorrelated groups of such adjacent
tones which experience uncorrelated channels and therefore, could be used for sharing
independent random phase values. Consequently, by using a Ns-tone OFDM, we increase
the averaging by a factor of bNs
L
c and the KGR by the factor of L at the same time.
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3.6.2 Key Generation Rate
A key advantage of our system is its dramatically higher KGR compared to legacy PLS
systems. For detailed KGR computation we need to take a look at our encryption method
again. In section 2.6 we argued that each common phase value can mask a 2m-PSK symbol
by phase rotating at transmitter and de-rotating at receiver. It is useful if we establish a
criteria for choosing m here, based on our estimation error. Figure 3.12 easily illustrates
the idea of choosing a proper m for preventing 2m-PSK symbols to go beyond their true
decision boundaries after rotating and de-rotating process. In fact, by choosing the largest
m that satisfies σE <
pi
2m
, we guarantee that a majority of encrypted symbols are recovered
without error at the other side. We choose this m as number of bits per common phase
for computing our KGR.
The whole process of sharing a single phase in two-antennae system without averaging
takes about 2 × frameperiod(2 × 64 = 128µs) and about twice as much for the four-
antennae system in our implementation, which means we can share about 7800 and 3800
phase values per second. With σE around 16
◦ and 20◦ for no data disposal case, the m
would be 3 bits per phase value for both two-antennae and four-antennae systems according
to above discussed criteria, which gives us KGRs equal to 23.4 and 11.7 Kb/s per OFDM
tone respectively. These KGR rates stand out if we note that the KGRs reported in [24]
are in order of few hundred bits per second as summarized in Table 3.1.
The KGR rate could dramatically increase with larger bandwidth. [12] has reported
rates up to 128 bits per channel probe for UWB stationary channels. In the case of
our system, increasing bandwidth could result in shorter OFDM symbol time duration
and larger number of resolvable paths (uncorrelated OFDM tones) both of which directly
increase our KGR. In case of shortening the time duration, KGR is also limited by RF-
mirrors switching speed which is around 2× 106 switches per second now.
To conclude this discussion, we can claim that with increasing bandwidth, proper av-
eraging specially in frequency domain, and choosing RF-mirrors combinations which yield
non-LOS channel states, we can reach KGR rates much higher than the aforementioned
rates.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of KGR for different key generation systems
Representative Work Testbed Parameter KGR
Two-antennae system WARP1 CSI (channel phase) 23.4 Kb/s per
OFDM tone
Four-antennae system WARP1 CSI (channel phase) 11.7 Kb/s per
OFDM tone
Lie et al. [8] Laptop with In-
tel WiFi Link
5300 NIC
CSI 32 bit/s per
OFDM tone
Zeng et al. [23] Laptop with In-
tel WiFi Link
5300 NIC
RSS 10 bit/s
Wei et al. [21] Laptop with
Atherons NIC
RSS 100 bit/s
Patwari et al. [14] TelosB sensor
mote
RSS 10 ∼ 22 bit/s
Ali et al. [1] MICAZ sensor
mote
RSS 0.037 ∼ 0.205
bit/s
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Figure 3.6: State machine of two-antennae system
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Figure 3.7: State machine of four-antennae system
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.8: Illustration of correspondence between (a) high estimation error (b) LOS-
dominant points and (c) low normalized energy
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.9: Effect of low normalized energy (less than 0.25) data disposal on shared phase
values for two-antennae system (a) before disposal (b) after disposal
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.10: Effect of low-normalized-energy (less than 0.36) data disposal on shared phase
values for four-antennae system (a) before disposal (b) after disposal
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.11: (a) Effect of averaging on the estimation error (b) Effect of low-normalized-
energy data disposal on the estimation error
Figure 3.12: Illustration of choosing m for masking 2m-PSK symbols
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Work
4.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we introduced a new practical method to realize one-time pad perfect secrecy
for wireless communication. We started with Shannon’s perfect secrecy model based on
Vernam’s one-time pad stream cipher, briefly surveyed different PLS approaches that try
to exploit the wireless channel random nature in favor of generating random keys to be
shared between legitimate parties, while keeping the shared key out of reach of illegitimate
ones. We argued that among different channel probing parameters, channel phase is the
optimal choice because of its uniform distribution over the wide range of [0, 2pi], although
there are concerns in extracting the channel phase, mostly from an implementation point
of view. We also discussed about other limitations of legacy PLS schemes regarding very
low KGRs due to static or slow variations of wireless channel.
Our system with introducing a scalable practical method to extract channel phase
as probing parameter, intentionally perturbing the wireless channel to produce random
channel states in a much faster pace than inherent channel variation would do, and also
using modulo-2pi encryption method, made it possible to go beyond legacy PLS methods
limitations and drawbacks in terms of true perfect secrecy requirements.
We presented in detail, the system model and security arguments for both simple state-
of-the-art two-antennae system and more secure four-antennae system. With the argument
made in the last paragraph of section 2.4, we actually showed that two-antennae system,
in addition to its simplicity and efficiency, has all the capabilities of the four-antennae
system except sending secret pilots by both nodes/parties. It was also described that in
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case of phase relaying, we need to use four-antennae structure to keep our system immune
to eavesdropping. We also briefed a group phase sharing method for sharing common
phase values between more than two nodes and concluded that this method, combined
with our RF-mirrors structure and scalable PHY design could become a practical group
phase sharing method, nevertheless, there are security concerns about this scheme, as its
safety solely relies on the safety of its secret pilots not on spatial decorrelation (as in
two-antennae system) or both (as in four-antennae system).
The scalable PHY design based on OFDM was discussed in detail including a practical
approach to estimate phase of random channel states without ambiguity in the receiver.
Practical algorithms for both systems were also elaborated along with detailed state ma-
chine diagrams showcasing the sequential logic design.
Finally, we presented the empirical results of our actual implementation and discussed
the phase estimation error and methods to diminish this error, focusing on discarding the
LOS-dominant data from estimations, and also averaging in time and frequency domain.
We showed that our system can generate secure and truly random keys with a rate dra-
matically higher than previous PLS schemes, which can be still much higher, provided that
we use multiple OFDM tones instead of one, have higher bandwidth, and avoid near-LOS
configurations of the RF-mirrors antenna.
4.2 Future Work
There is no end point for any research. To further this research, following points and hints
on research areas could be useful:
• The system presented in this thesis is a design for testing (DFT), in the sense that
its focus is on the primary function of the system and its optimization. In a DFT,
as well as extra measures necessary for testing, some simplifications are made and
some practical factors are ignored. To move towards the design for manufacturabil-
ity (DFM), the first step is making the nodes completely standalone. That is, we
cannot have a common RF reference clock or more importantly, host cannot send
synchronous resets for each round of phase sharing to nodes. What we need is an
initial synchronization process between nodes, as part of a complete MAC design,
and after that each node can be reset in a timely manner on its own. For the case
of RF reference clock, we have to add CFO correction unit to the design. All the
pre-processing also need to be carried out by the embedded software of standalone
nodes rather than the host.
38
• In the case of the standalone nodes, a simple key agreement stage is needed. In our
system as mentioned before, the logic for both two and four antennae case is designed
in a sequential way, which means that the slave node only receives a common phase
value if the master node has received the common value for that round. Therefore,
after sharing say N common phase values, we need a mechanism in which the slave
let the master know which numbers in [1, N ] it has missed. This acknowledgement
could also include the numbers he is discarding due to low energy or any other reason.
• Our current system is using only one OFDM subcarrier. Based on the discussion in
sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, it can easily be extended to use all 64 subcarriers to enjoy
both averaging in frequency domain and higher KGR.
• In addition to or instead of the criteria proposed in section 3.6.2 for choosing m, a
channel coding scheme could be used to encode bits that are mapped to 2m-PSK
constellation, to further reduce the effect of phase estimation error and resulted
mismatch in the final shared key.
• To avoid LOS, an adaptive mechanism could be designed to detect the LOS direction
and keep the RF mirrors around that direction constantly ON to block LOS. RF-
mirrors redesign is also an option.
• All the tests for this thesis were carried out in a single room. Extensive tests can be
done by putting nodes at different locations such as separate rooms with corridors in
between or outdoor space, to have a better understanding of the system performance
in different environments.
• A practical implementation for group phase sharing system, such as the one in this
thesis, could be a challenging and yet promising project for future.
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Appendix A
Logic Design Schematics
Figure A.1: Logic design for the IFFT at transmitter
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Figure A.2: Logic design for FFT at receiver
Figure A.3: Logic design for complex division of payload by reference
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Figure A.4: State machine designed for two-antennae’ transmitter
Figure A.5: State machine designed for two-antennae’ receiver
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Figure A.6: Logic design for RF-mirrors switching
Figure A.7: Logic design for phase relaying
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Figure A.8: State machine designed for four-antennae’ receiver
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Figure A.9: State machine designed for four-antennae’ transmitter
49
Figure A.10: Logic design for reference and payload timing
50
Figure A.11: Logic design for detected symbol capturing
51
Figure A.12: Logic design for transmitter antenna selection in four-antennae system
52
Figure A.13: Logic design for receiver antenna selection in four-antennae system
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